The Mind-Body Problem, which constitutes the starting point for a large part of the speculations about consciousness and conscious experience, can be re-stated in an equivalent way, using the 'brain duplication' argument described in this paper. If we assume that consciousness follows from a peculiar organization of physical matter and energy, namely that it does not transcend physical reality, then the brain duplication argument gives a possible interesting physical characterization of the mind: namely, a sort of extensive interdependence of the brain with the whole surrounding physical world in giving rise to consciousness.
Introduction
One of the most fundamental problem in conscious experiences and consciousness is the following: if I am able to completely describe the physical state 1 of my brain, may I safely say to have completely described my mental state, my subjective experience too? The point is that my subjective experiences, like for example those of pain, joy or smell (generally referred to as qualia), seem not to get exhausted in a physical-functional description of my cerebral states, even in the most complete description we are able to imagine to. Actually, the description of the physical processes which take place in my brain, when I experience pain for example, seems not to be a complete description of my subjective experience of pain. Rather, at the most it seems to be only a complete description of the cerebral states of my brain during my pain experience.
In other words, it seems that a barrier, impassable to every physical theory, forbids any complete objective description of subjective experience, or, at least, every complete objective description of a subjective experience simply does not include the subjective experience itself. Namely, the objective description and the subjective experience seem to belong to different and 'orthogonal' dimensions, the outside and the inside.
What I have described above briefly summarizes the well-known Mind-Body Problem, the main ingredient of the philosophical investigations of the mind and a thorn in the side of physicalism, namely of those who believe in a complete reduction of consciousness to peculiar physical processes of the brain (for an accessible and exhaustive review of the Mind-Body Problem see, for example, Nagel [1] and Chalmers [2] ).
In this paper I provide an equivalent formulation of the Mind-Body Problem, which I will call the 'brain duplication' argument, and I will show that if we assume that consciousness is in any case a physical process which takes place in the physical world, in the most general sense of these terms, namely that it does not transcend physical reality, then the human brain, in giving rise to the mind, might be characterized by the astonishing property of an extensive interdependence with the whole surrounding physical world.
The 'brain duplication' argument
For the sake of thought experiment, let us suppose that we manage to create an exact, physically identical duplicate of my brain, as it is in this precise moment. Actually, it does not matter whether we do not known operatively how to do it. The point is that since at least a brain exists physically, then nothing forbids us to imagine an identical physical duplicate of it, as well as nothing forbids us to imagine an identical physical duplicate, atom by atom, of the sheet of paper on which these words are written, just for the fact that such sheet of paper exists, even if probably we will never be able to do the actual duplicate. Now, just after the creation of this duplicate, how would my own consciousness react? As everyone of you can experience directly, one of the leading characteristics of consciousness is the perception of its own uniqueness, the uniqueness of oneself and of its own conscious experience, and, in addition, the perception of the persistence of such uniqueness (I feel to be myself also in different periods and different places). Therefore, if I were able to exactly duplicate my brain, would my own consciousness change? And if it changes, how does it change? Would I feel to be here, where I was before the duplication, but at the same time would I feel to be there, where my brain duplicate is now?
I believe that the most natural answer for everyone is that I will continue to be myself as I was before the duplication. But then, who or what is my exact physical duplicate? If the two brains are physically identical and their consciousnesses are different, in what do they differ? Here two possible approaches to the problem are presented.
Non-physical explanation
Consciousness is not physically reproducible in the reality. Namely it does not depend on physical reality and it is in some sense 'outside' it: thus, distinct conscious experiences and consciousnesses may even be attached to two physically identical brains, or only one of these brains may be conscious (and the other one may not; the duplicate brain, for example, might be a so-called zombie). If it is so, there is not much to do; as a matter of fact, consciousness would constitute a prime and alien property, to be added to the rest of the physical properties of the brain.
However, such hypothesis seems to be scientifically frustrating and, after all, not particularly reasonable. I guess that not many researchers would honestly feel up to deny any link between consciousness and the physical world (even if such link is not completely clear from a scientific point of view).
Moreover, even if we assume that the existence of the brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the presence of consciousness, the latter must necessarily have a physical interaction with the brain (otherwise it would not even make sense to talk about brain as necessary condition, without speaking about the substantial amount of data achieved nowadays in the neurosciences on the neural correlates of consciousness) and therefore consciousness must be a physically characterizable, a physically tractable agent. Such physical agent might be completely internal or external (partially or totally) to the brain. In the first case we just would have that the exact physical reproduction of one's brain would give tout court the consciousness of that person (and hence, the brain duplication dilemma). If, on the contrary, this agent were external, it might be one and unique, or there might be many, one of them corresponding to each consciousness currently existing in the world. Yet, this further distinction is not important in our case: plausibly, two physically identical brains would always interact in the same way with the same external physical agent (like two equally tuned radio receivers 'interact' always with the same radio station, although there are a lot of different radio frequencies in the air), and again the brain duplication dilemma would be left untouched. However, I believe that now this dilemma is ready to be tackled with the possible physical explanation described in the next section.
If you are willing to know more about the issue of the relation between brain and consciousness, you can see Chalmers [3] who provides, through a series of simple thought experiments, an interesting support in favor of the thesis that conscious experiences depend on a peculiar functional organization of the physical constituents of the brain and that every physical system (every physical substrate) which reproduces such functional organization will have the same conscious experiences. Chalmers named this thesis the principle of organizational invariance.
A possible physical explanation
Let us suppose instead that consciousness depends on physical reality, namely on the peculiar organization of physical matter and energy, in the most general sense of these terms, and also let us do not exclude the possibility, suggested in the previous section, that consciousness originates not only in the physics of the brain but also through the interaction with an external physical agent.
A possible explanation of the seemingly paradoxical picture originated in the brain duplication argument is that (the evolution of) the cerebral processes involved in the rise of consciousness might physically depend not only on the physics of the brain itself but actually also on all the things which physically surround such brain, in the sense that it depends on the organization of all the surrounding physical matter and energy 2 . Thus, the brain might be far from being a semi-closed box, opened only to the five senses, and the common perception that our brain does not continuously interact at a deeper physical level with the rest of the physical world might be simply wrong 3 .
In such framework, the physically exact copy of my brain, which is in the region of the space B(x c , y c , z c , t c ), interacts with all the surrounding physical world, and thus also with my original brain which is in the region of space B(x o , y o , z o , t o ) (with t o = t c , if the brain duplication is not instantaneous). Similarly, my own original brain, which is in the region of space B(x o , y o , z o , t o ), interacts with all the surrounding physical world, and thus also with the physically exact copy of my brain, which is in B(x c , y c , z c , t c ). Therefore, it is clear (see fig. 1 ) that the boundary conditions for the two identical brains are not identical, and the evolution of cerebral states, as well as consciousness, might not be identical (although the memory of all the past experiences might be the same in every details for both brains). A similar conclusion on the possibility of an extensive physical interdependence of the human brain with the whole surrounding physical world in giving rise to the mind has been drawn in another thought experiment (D'Abramo [4] ) but through a different approach, which included the notion of algorithmic complexity.
So far, we have never made mention to how consciousness rises, or to which are the specific physical 'mechanisms' at the basis of consciousness, but this was not the topic of our paper, other than being a very complicated and long-standing issue (irresolvable at the moment, I think). On the contrary, we have proposed an interesting physical characterization of consciousness and mind: the uniqueness of conscious experience and consciousness might depend also on the whole surrounding physical world, in the sense of the organization of its physical matter and energy, and therefore, if this were the case, it would be very strange if the rise itself of consciousness and mind did not depend on the extensive interaction of the brain with whole surrounding physical world 4 .
We believe that talking about the necessary physical mechanisms responsible for the suggested extensive interaction, and actually talking about the detailed physical dynamics and evolution of such interaction, is premature at the moment. It might be said (and it was actually said already) that the human brain may be assimilated to a complex dynamical system, extremely sensitive to all the surrounding physical conditions (in such case we should mention the so-called deterministic chaos; see for example Newman [5] ), or that quantum mechanics may be deeply involved (many people have proposed various quantum mechanisms to explain consciousness, so to compile a complete list of references on this topic is hopeless; see for example Bohm [6] and references therein), or, most probably, that a new kind of physics is needed. However, although such aspect of the problem is obviously essential in the study of the origin of consciousness, it is secondary in this context.
